In the introduction to Natural Right and History, Strauss begins very clearly but soon “descends” to obscurity, starting around page 5. I am reading NRH in preparation for my essays on Liberalism that will be published over at MCC.
In the introduction, Strauss is arguing against the relativists; he begins by moving through the argument very clearly.
“What is right is determined by legislators and courts, i.e., what is right in every society is determined by the law.” Counter: We do (and must) distinguish between just and unjust laws. (p. 2)
“We make these judgments on the law not according to natural right, but because we are a product of our society or ‘civilization.’” Counter: we can ask the same question bout our society of civilization: is it just? is it any better than a cannibalistic society? The mere fact that we can raise the question shows that we are not completely beholden to our society, in slavery to it. (pp. 2-3)
“The question, though, is impossible to answer. Just because you can ask it doesn’t mean you can answer it. Just because you mustask it doesn’t mean you can answer it. All that can be done is to look at the need of your society or the needs of various societies. You can see that each is different. But there is no judging between them.” Counter: you cannot even discuss the needs of your own society without reference to a natural right, for the simple reason that there are competing claims to “what is most needed.” We must be capable of distinguishing genuine needs from spurious needs. There are even suicidal claims that need to be rejected. (p. 3)
“All you’ve done is, again, show a need, not a potential answer to that need. Modern social science is perfectly aware of this. The modern social scientist doesn’t claim to be able to determine any ends by which he could distinguish between spurious and genuine needs. What he does claim, and he is here on solid ground, is the ability to discover the means according to whatever end is posited. Means can be determined rationally. Ends cannot, however much it may seem like we need them to be.” Counter: This is slavish and absurd. A good slave will never be able to determine his own course, but he will be good at effecting the master’s will. It is silly to think men actually gain scientific wisdom in effecting ends without any knowledge whatsoever in choosing them. Futher: aside from being slavish and absud, it could be evil, i.e., it is nihilistic. (pp. 3-4)
“You misread things entirely and your three points are mere rhetoric. Even if our inability to know ends implied that we were slaves, made knowing the means very difficult if nigh impossible, and made us evil—that would not mean we had the ability to know the ends! Your multiplication of aspersions suggests what we know: you cannot povide a way to know natural right. You are hiding behind appeals to shame. You’re right; we have now shame. We are much too hard-nosed for that naivety. But you are completely wrong in your estimation of our science! The obsession with natural right, with “ends” and these kinds of things, is a close-minded way of seeing the world motivated by insecurity, by the “need” to answer these questions. It was just such a way of viewing the world that lead to the totaliarianisms of the twentieth century and religious barbarisms of Christendom. Mankind gains for itself a great good when it matures past these things; being mature means knowing that you cannot be intolerant to other civilizations and other beliefs. Our social science, by bravely demonstrating what can and cannot be known, has finally found a morality in accord with reason, namely, tolerance.” Decisive Counter: Well you obviously have a standard of natural right: the men who are tolerant, and who know they cannot judge others, are superior and act according to the “true view” of things. You have a formulated the natural right to reject all “absolutist” ideologies. (p. 5)
One would think is a terminal point: the rejection of natural right is shown to be an assertion of natural right, i.e., the assertion of natural right is unavoidable. Strauss “has them” so to speak: not only do these Modern Relativist-Egalitarians (MR-Es) not understand themselves, but it is now possible to evaluate their claim as a claim to natural right.
However, instead of explaining his victory and assessing their claim to natural right, Strauss writes.
“When liberals became impatient of the absolute limits to diversity and individuality that are imposed even by the most liberal version of natural right, they had to make a choice between natural right and the uninhibited cultivation of individuality.” (p. 5)
Natural right sets absolute limits on diversity and individuality: even the most liberal version does this. These limits (which enables them to be evaluated) are hateful, so it then appears that a choice between natural right and “uninhibited cultivation of individuality” is actually possible.
If this “uninhibited cultivation” were genuinely possible, the MR-Es would have escaped, and the philosopher would have to abandon natural right. That is, up to this point Strauss had proceeded very clearly, forcing the MR-Es down paths that lead to the expected confrontation. Then he gives voice to their irrational assertions to the contrary.
I suppose the meaning is this: Natural Right and History is a book where Strauss admits that it would be too difficult, too inaccessible and unpersuasive, to directly evaluate the natural right claim of “even the most liberal version.” Instead of proceeding dialectically, he begins to describe the kinds of things MR-Es often do to avoid admitting they are limited by natural right.
First: they hide the “unequal rank of their objectives” behind “unequal rank of the acts of choosing.” Put plainly: MR-Es begin to judge themselves and others according to motive alone. The difference between a good or bad choice is the motive behind it; their approach to “what is good” is then reduced to a “resolute or deadly serious decision.” (pp. 5-6)
This is intolerance. Consider the kind of man who will assert they are “standing with truth” when what they mean is that they won’t admit some ugly things are necessary or reasonable. Example: when you are talking to someone who says they always put “the other” first, you can ask them things like,
“Thought experiment: A building were on fire and inside is your kid and someone else’s kid, but you can only save one. Which do you save?”
I have had many answers, ranging from a rejection of the thought experiment “I will save both” / “this would never happen,” to insanity “I would save the other child,” to straight evasion where the person just starts in on some other assertion. This kind person is extremely intolerant in their heart and mind and is capable of authorizing extreme injustice. So long as they are not guilty of “wrong think” they will be at peace whatever happens. Machiavelli set out to wreck such people.
Once this flight to “good motives” is taken, people stop really believing in principles. That is, a good motive is a selfless motive, but reason constantly suggests that all men act selfishly. It appears as if we progress in philosophy we progress in immorality. And since Civilization is attached to reason, there is a temptation to reject civilization for something more barbaric. Man feels his ability to be loyal slipping away—loyalty begins to look unreasonable and uncivilized. Civilization begins to blush at its need for loyalty. Those young men who understand just how important loyalty is for them turn against civilization. They see just how much better their lives would be if there were something that demanded and rewarded loyalty. (p. 6)
They adopt what Strauss calls “fanatical obscurantism.” (Strauss elsewhere calls this German nihilism.)
The MR-Es are roused from their slumber. Out of their indignation at the youthful rejection of what they take for granted, and upon what their security rests, the modern political scientist turns back to natural right. But this is not a good reason to trust in natural right.
“The fact that reason compels us to go beyond the ideal of our society does not yet guarantee that in taking this step we shall not be confronted with a void or with a multiplicity of incompatible and equally justifiable principles of ‘natural right’” (p. 6)
That is, after having shown that this objection is made on a plane where no answer is possible, Strauss descends to that plane and joins with the MR-Es, takes up their anxiety and sets out to relieve it.
Plane of Thought. What do I mean when I say “some arguments on this plane of thought, some happen on others planes of thought”? I try to mean what I think Strauss means. Example of the plane that nourishes relativism: “where is there a higher authority to adjudicate this question of natural right? If there isn’t one, then no adjudication is possible, and if no adjudication is possible no ranking is possible. But natural right presupposes a ranking.” Strauss had pulled the MR-Es out of this plane of thought and refuted the them on a different plane of thought. Once the MR-Es ventured to make a claim as to what others should do, and we make these claims even if they amount to “leave me alone,” they stumbled into the plane of thought where one needn’t appeal to a impartial third party, where one had to make some choice—third party or no. Something lured Strauss away from the clarity provided by this plane, back into the plane where one must have the authorization of an impartial third party. What lured him back was the sight of indignation, of the Thrasymachean response to the plain where clarity is possible. “Let us bewae of the danger of pursuing a Socratic goal with the means, and the temper, of Thrasymachus.” (p. 6)
If we are going to come to an answer, one un-inspired by Thrasymachean anger, we must approach the question on the plane that banishes indignation as a matter form. Entering back into the plane where the relativist is not refuted is required by “duty.” “The gravity of the issue imposes upon us the duty of detached, theoretical, impartial discussion.” (pp. 6-7)
On this plane, “actual knowledge” is not possible but “recollection” is. Looking into this question requires doing “history of ideas” work. It is hoped we can gain clarity through the study of what isn’t ours, and that this will be safe, i.e., free from partiality.
But this clarity will itself inspire conflict! By exposing “the pedigree of ideas,” we expose differences in society and thus foster opposing camps; but opposing camps within a society embitters politics. There are not only different “planes” but there are different “dimensions.” (Strauss uses both words and they do not mean the same thing. Planes have dimensions.)
An impartial and theoretical discussion, one made in the pursuit of truth, does not permit one to practice “politic restraint,” because the goal of the discussion isn’t “peace” or “moderation” but truth. What can be done, however, is to transcend the parties in existence in one’s time: Strauss will teach “left and right” that they both suffer from the same error, the error of modernity, and therefore avoid appearing to sanction the “hot and blind zeal of partisanship.”
Both of the camps in our society deny teleology of the “universe.” No one is willing (or seemingly able) to discard the word “universe” for “whole”, i.e., no one is willing to defend the ancient’s teleological conception of the world. However, no one is able to apply this insight to man. Both camps try to explain teleological conceptions of man while discarding such conceptions of the world.
Strauss will treat teleology as something that stands or falls w/ “the world.” That is, he will limit himself to speaking of teleology as if it meant that man is supported, that mankind is supported. Teleology taken in this sense means that man’s happiness, as it is generally understood, is secured by justice, or by his living according to nature.
This keeps things moderate. Strauss will avoid either a Platonic or Nietzschean appraisal of our situation, instead blaming “relativism and individualism.” He will make the error of our time one of pride or hubris, rather than “democracy” or “decline.”
In the last paragraph of the introduction, he makes it absolutely clear that the book is “limited to that aspect of the problem of natural right which can be clarified within the confines of the social sciences.” (p. 8)
For a genuine critique of liberalism, we have to exceed the limitations Strauss placed on himself in this essay and in other essays and lectures.
Post Script. If you followed along and have comments or contrary readings, please let me know, either in the comments below or through email.
Especially: if you have thoughts about the differences between “plane” and “dimension” in NRH, I am eager to hear your explanation. Strauss uses both in the book and they appear to mean different things.
Dimension is in intro, I, II, IV, Rousseau (once). Plane is Hobbes, Rousseau, Burke. The only chapter of overlap is once each in Rousseau, none in III or Locke. The Hobbes chapter introduces philosophy on new "plane" on the basis of mathematization and Strauss adopts the language of mathematics. The Hobbes chapter sets theory and practice, formerly parallel, on a path of convergence, as if headed to a vanishing point, which is chapter I.
Recommend this: https://isi.org/intercollegiate-review/darwinian-conservatism-versus-metaphysical-conservatism/